This book analyzes the following four distinct, although not dissimilar, areas of social choice theory and welfare economics: nonstrategic choice, Harsanyi's aggregation theorems, distributional ethics and strategic choice. While for aggregation of individual ranking of social states, whether the persons behave strategically or non-strategically, the decision making takes place under complete certainty; in the Harsanyi framework uncertainty has a significant role in the decision making process. Another ingenious characteristic of the book is the discussion of ethical approaches to evaluation of inequality arising from unequal distributions of achievements in the different dimensions of human well-being. Given its wide coverage, combined with newly added materials, end-chapter problems and bibliographical notes, the book will be helpful material for students and researchers interested in this frontline area research. Its lucid exposition, along with non-technical and graphical illustration of the concepts, use of numerical examples, makes the book a useful text.

This book offers a collection of original, state-of-the-art essays addressing various aspects of the economic analysis of inequality, deprivation, poverty measurement and social polarization, at both the theoretical and empirical level. Written by leading authorities in the fields of distributional analysis and normative economics, the respective chapters present detailed overviews of cutting-edge literature, as well as stand-alone research. Compiled as a tribute to Satya Ranjan Chakravarty's lifetime contributions in the fields of normative economics and distributional analysis, it represents an indispensable resource for researchers, policymakers and doctoral students working on issues pertaining to income/wealth distribution, social inclusion and poverty reduction.

The primary goal of the book is to present the ideas and research findings of active researchers from various communities (physicists, economists, mathematicians, financial engineers) working in the field of "Econophysics", who have undertaken the task of modelling and analyzing order-driven markets. Of primary interest in these studies are the mechanisms leading to the statistical regularities ("stylized facts") of price statistics. Results pertaining to other important issues such as market impact, the profitability of trading strategies, or mathematical models for microstructure effects, are also presented. Several leading researchers in these fields report on their recent work and also review the contemporary literature. Some historical perspectives, comments and debates on recent issues in Econophysics research are also included.

The primary goal of the book is to present the ideas and research findings of active researchers from various communities (physicists, economists, mathematicians, financial engineers) working in the field of "Econophysics," who have undertaken the task of modelling and analyzing order-driven markets. Of primary interest in these studies are the mechanisms leading to the statistical regularities ("stylized facts") of price statistics. Results pertaining to other important issues such as market impact, the profitability of trading strategies, or mathematical models for microstructure effects, are also presented. Several leading researchers in these fields report on their recent work and also review the contemporary literature. Some historical perspectives, comments and debates on recent issues in Econophysics research are also included.

This book analyzes the following four distinct, although not dissimilar, areas of social choice theory and welfare economics: nonstrategic choice, Harsanyi's aggregation theorems, distributional ethics and strategic choice. While for aggregation of individual ranking of social states, whether the persons behave strategically or non-strategically, the decision making takes place under complete certainty; in the Harsanyi framework uncertainty has a significant role in the decision making process. Another ingenious characteristic of the book is the discussion of ethical approaches to evaluation of inequality arising from unequal distributions of achievements in the different dimensions of human well-being. Given its wide coverage, combined with newly added materials, end-chapter problems and bibliographical notes, the book will be helpful material for students and researchers interested in this frontline area research. Its lucid exposition, along with non-technical and graphical illustration of the concepts, use of numerical examples, makes the book a useful text.

This book offers a collection of original, state-of-the-art essays addressing various aspects of the economic analysis of inequality, deprivation, poverty measurement and social polarization, at both the theoretical and empirical level. Written by leading authorities in the fields of distributional analysis and normative economics, the respective chapters present detailed overviews of cutting-edge literature, as well as stand-alone research. Compiled as a tribute to Satya Ranjan Chakravarty's lifetime contributions in the fields of normative economics and distributional analysis, it represents an indispensable resource for researchers, policymakers and doctoral students working on issues pertaining to income/wealth distribution, social inclusion and poverty reduction.

Cooperative game theory deals with situations where objectives of participants of the game are partially cooperative and partially conflicting. It is in the interest of participants to cooperate in the sense of making binding agreements to achieve the maximum possible benefit. When it comes to distribution of benefit/payoffs, participants have conflicting interests. Such situations are usually modelled as cooperative games. While the book mainly discusses transferable utility games, there is also a brief analysis of non-transferable utility games. Alternative solution concepts to cooperative game theoretic problems are presented in chapters 1-9 and the next four chapters present issues related to computations of solutions discussed in the earlier chapters. The proofs of all results presented in the book are quite explicit. Additionally the mathematical techniques employed in demonstrating the results will be helpful to those who wish to learn application of mathematics for solving problems in game theory.

Cooperative game theory deals with situations where objectives of participants of the game are partially cooperative and partially conflicting. It is in the interest of participants to cooperate in the sense of making binding agreements to achieve the maximum possible benefit. When it comes to distribution of benefit/payoffs, participants have conflicting interests. Such situations are usually modelled as cooperative games. While the book mainly discusses transferable utility games, there is also a brief analysis of non-transferable utility games. Alternative solution concepts to cooperative game theoretic problems are presented in chapters 1-9 and the next four chapters present issues related to computations of solutions discussed in the earlier chapters. The proofs of all results presented in the book are quite explicit. Additionally the mathematical techniques employed in demonstrating the results will be helpful to those who wish to learn application of mathematics for solving problems in game theory.